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THE NEW RC: WILL IT PLEASE ANYONE?
Dr. Dallas D. Owens
Strategic Studies Institute
To their credit, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) have
proposed sweeping changes to make their components capable of meeting future Army
requirements.1 Predictions for those future requirements come from a variety of Department of
Defense (DoD) offices and envision a near- to mid-term strategic environment requiring
constant mobilization at levels less than, but near, those currently experienced.2 In turn, the
ARNG and USAR know they cannot meet that need unless significant changes are made to their
force structure, training, and mobilization process. Central to their proposed changes is the
notion of a rotational force.
Shortly after unveiling their respective 6- and 5-year rotational plans, the ARNG and USAR
began receiving a variety of objections. These objections correctly recognize that, for the plans to
succeed, all of DoD must discipline itself to use the Reserve Components (RC) within some
severe parameters. These parameters are necessary for the RC to introduce sufficient
predictability into their force to manage it effectively. The DoD, in turn, must provide the RC
with strategic predictability, a difficult task in times of strategic turbulence, especially when
much of that turbulence is outside of DoD control. Any DoD commitment to predictability must
therefore come from what they can control and that involves internal measures.
The most apparent troublesome parameter for the RC plans concerns the approximate
number and duration of troops they can provide. No more than about 20% of the RC end
strength would be available for about 1 year of boots-on-ground. That level is below current RC
troop requirements, but not by a lot. To reduce RC participation to this level would require
either combatant commanders to reduce requirements or the Army to rely on AC assets to make
up the difference; either way, an RC appetite suppressant is required. For 20% to be enough, it
must be the right package of capabilities. For the RC to prepare the right package, combatant
commanders must have very precise contingency plans. But because plans can never be perfect,
the AC must have capabilities to overcome unavoidable inadequacies in what the RC is
prepared to provide. The logic behind “rebalancing” is precisely to allow components to
restructure their force so they can provide the capabilities that plans call for and have sufficient
inter-component flexibility to overcome the unexpected.
The RC recognizes that there is a possibility for a much higher, relatively short-term,
requirement to support a major combat operation (MCO). Afterwards the RC would require a
“reset” to allow return to the more routine rotational scheme. That reset is outside the scope of
the plans and would certainly hamper RC support for a short period. But such a reset would
also be necessary for the AC, and neither exceptional requirement should detract from the value
of any component plan. To complicate matters, the reset might occur simultaneously with the
phase IV portion of a MCO and, if Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is a valid model, would
likely require 20% availability of the RC. What this means is the reset must be incorporated into
the mind-set (planning) and resourcing of the MCO, even after “major” combat operations
formally end.
Another parameter is resource commitment. The RC requires a rapid transition to its new
force structure and training plan. The current degraded condition of the RC requires immediate
identification of the units that need to be ready to deploy next year, the year after, and the year

after that. The plans require immediate resources to redesign, equip, and train those near-term
rotations. Resource requirements compete with AC transformation, global war on terror
(GWOT) training, and current operations. The ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) are well
positioned to be sufficiently resourced for their transformation because they are programmed to
reset, equip, and train on a schedule similar to, but over a longer period of time than, their AC
counterparts. This positioning is in part due to a more mature OIF/Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) rotational schedule for BCTs than is provided to support units. The
transformational resource picture is less clear for non-BCT ARNG units and USAR units. The
necessary resource commitment is not just for the success of RC plans, but for the success of
Army and, ultimately, DoD transformation.
Finally, the RC plans depend on politically sensitive changes in mobilization policy. The
highly touted system of using volunteers early in the mobilization process is politically
palatable, but if unchanged, would wreak havoc on the RC rotational force.3 If individual
members of units in the “ready rotation” queue are allowed to volunteer, those units then
require cross-leveling from other units to again become sufficiently ready to mobilize and
deploy. The cascading effect from cross-leveling makes each succeeding rotation less capable by
destroying unit coherence and rendering useless any earlier investments in readiness.4 One way
to avoid the “volunteer trap” is to support mobilization reforms that would make possible rapid
access to ready units. Perhaps even more important, support must be garnered from DoD and
Congress to use those ready units rather than volunteers, even when it is politically expedient
to avoid involuntary mobilization.
This cursory review of the RC transformation plans and their constraints for supporting
combatant commanders, resource demands, and requirements for mobilization reforms makes
it easy to see why those plans generated resistance from those with political or resource vested
interests―and that includes about every agency in DoD and beyond. However, the RC
leadership correctly surmises that doing nothing is not an option; inaction ensures the RC
cannot continue to support operations at anywhere near current levels. The RC plans, with all
their potential shortfalls, are at least a good faith effort to meet their obligations to the Army
and Nation. I would hope that detractors from their plans would feel obligated to offer
alternatives, not just criticisms. The RC leadership has publicly expressed willingness to
consider recommendations for better solutions, but so far none have been forthcoming.
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